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a b s t r a c t
Intuitively, Braess’s paradox states that destroying a part of a network may improve
the common latency of selfish flows at Nash equilibrium. Such a paradox is a
pervasive phenomenon in real-world networks. Any administrator who wants to improve
equilibrium delays in selfish networks, is facing some basic questions:
– Is the network paradox-ridden?
– How can we delete some edges to optimize equilibrium flow delays?
– How can we modify edge latencies to optimize equilibrium flow delays?
Unfortunately, such questions lead to NP-hard problems in general. In this work, we
impose some natural restrictions on our networks, e.g. we assume strictly increasing linear
latencies. Our target is to formulate efficient algorithms for the three questions above. We
manage to provide:
– A polynomial-time algorithm that decides if a network is paradox-ridden, when
latencies are linear and strictly increasing.
– A reduction of the problem of deciding if a network with (arbitrary) linear latencies is
paradox-ridden to the problem of generating all optimal basic feasible solutions of a
Linear Program that describes the optimal traffic allocations to the edges with constant
latency.
– An algorithm for finding a subnetwork that is almost optimal wrt equilibrium latency.
Our algorithm is subexponentialwhen the number of paths is polynomial and each path
is of polylogarithmic length.
– A polynomial-time algorithm for the problem of finding the best subnetwork which
outperforms any known approximation for the case of strictly increasing linear
latencies.
– A polynomial-time method that turns the optimal flow into a Nash flow by deleting
the edges not used by the optimal flow, and performing minimal modifications on the
latencies of the remaining ones.
Our results provide a deeper understanding of the computational complexity of recognizing
the most severe manifestations of Braess’s paradox, and our techniques show novel
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ways of using the probabilistic method and of exploiting convex separable quadratic
programs.
© 2012 Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
A typical instance of selfish routing consists of a directed network with a source s and a destination t , with each edge
having a non-decreasing function that determines the edge’s latency as a function of its traffic, and a rate of traffic divided
among an infinite population of players, each willing to route a negligible amount of traffic through an s − t path. The
players are non-cooperative and selfish, and seek to minimize the sum of edge latencies on their path. Observing the traffic
caused by others, each player selects an s− t path of minimum latency. Thus, they reach a Nash equilibrium (aka aWardrop
equilibrium), where all players route their traffic on paths of equal minimum latency. Under some general assumptions on
the latency functions, a Nash equilibrium flow (or simply aNash flow) exists and the common (and the total) players’ latency
in a Nash flow is unique (see e.g. [32,34]).
Motivation and previous work. A Nash equilibrium may not optimize the network performance, usually measured by the
total latency incurred by all players. The main tool for quantifying and understanding the performance degradation due to
the players’ non-cooperative and selfish behaviour has been the Price of Anarchy, which was suggested in a groundbreaking
work by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [21]. The Price of Anarchy (PoA) is the ratio of the total latency of the Nash flow to
the optimal total latency. Roughgarden [30] proved that the PoA for selfish routing is independent of the network topology
and atmost ρ(D), where ρ only depends on the class of latency functionsD (e.g. ρ is 4/3 for linear, and 27+6
√
3
23 for quadratic
latencies). Moreover, Roughgarden presented a class of instances for which the bound of ρ(D) is tight.
With the PoA for selfish routing very well understood, a few natural approaches for reducing it have been investigated.
A simple approach that does not require any network modifications is Stackelberg routing [20], where the administrator
exploits a small fraction of centrally routed (aka coordinated) traffic to improve the quality of the Nash flow reached by
the remaining selfish traffic. For parallel-link networks with arbitrary latencies and for general networks with polynomial
latencies, the coordinated traffic can be allocated so that the PoA decreases smoothly as the fraction of the coordinated
traffic increases (see e.g. [4,18,31,11] for the case of atomic players with unsplittable traffic). Unfortunately, there are
single-commodity instances for which the PoA remains unbounded under any allocation [4]. Also there are instances where
enforcing the optimal flowmay require a large fraction of the coordinated traffic [15] sacrificed through slower paths, since
optimal flows are unfairwrt path latency. A different approach is to introduce economic incentives, usuallymodeled as edge-
dependent per-unit-of-traffic tolls, that influence the players’ selfish choices and induce the optimal flow as the Nash flow of
the modified instance. In the refundable tolls setting, where tolls affect the players’ cost but not the network performance, a
set of tolls that enforce the optimal flow can be computed efficiently even for heterogeneous players,whomay have different
latency-vs-tolls valuations (see e.g. [7,10,17,6,12] for positive and negative results on refundable tolls for the case of atomic
players with unsplittable traffic). However, the idea of tolls is not appealing to the players, since large tolls that significantly
increase the players’ disutility (taxes paid plus latency) may be required to enforce the optimal flow (see e.g. [10]).
A simpler way of improving network performance at equilibrium is to exploit the essence of Braess’s paradox [5], namely
that removing some network edges may decrease the latency of the Nash flow (see Fig. 1 for the canonical example).
Thus, given an instance of selfish routing, the administrator seeks for the best subnetwork, i.e. the subnetwork induced
by edge deletions minimizing the players’ latency at equilibrium. Compared to Stackelberg routing and refundable tolls,
edge removals are simpler, more natural, and more appealing to both the network administrator and the players. From
the administrator’s point of view, blocking the traffic on some edges is arguably easier and less expensive to implement
than setting up a mechanism for collecting tolls on every edge and refunding them to the players. From the players’ point of
view, edge removal is applied only if it results in a (significant) improvement on their equilibrium latency, which is arguably
preferable to either a toll mechanism, that increases the disutility of all players, or a Stackelberg strategy, that sacrifices the
coordinated traffic to slower paths.
Recent work indicates that edge removal can offer a tangible improvement on the performance of real-world networks
(see e.g. [19,32]). In this vein, Valiant and Roughgarden [35] proved that Braess’s paradox occurs with high probability on
random networks, and that for a natural distribution of linear latencies, edge removal can improve the equilibrium latency
by a factor arbitrarily close to 4/3 (i.e. the worst-case PoA for linear latencies) with high probability (see also the references
in [35] for other results in the same spirit).
Unfortunately, Roughgarden [33] proved that it is NP-hard not only to find the best subnetwork, but also to compute any
meaningful approximation to the equilibrium latency on the best subnetwork. In particular, he showed that even for linear
latencies, it is NP-hard to distinguish between paradox-free instances, where edge removal cannot improve the equilibrium
latency, and paradox-ridden instances, where the total latency of the Nash flow on the best subnetwork is equal to the
optimal total latency on the original network. We stress here the importance of paradox-ridden instances: these are the
only networks that edge removals can decrease the PoA to 1. Furthermore, Roughgarden proved that for any ε > 0, it is
NP-hard to approximate the equilibrium latency on the best subnetwork within a factor of 4/3− ε for linear latencies, and
within a factor of⌊n/2⌋−ε for general latencies, where n denotes the number of nodes. In fact, the only known algorithm
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Fig. 1. (a). The optimal flow routes one half unit of traffic on the upper path s, v, t and one half unit on the lower path s, w, t , and achieves a total latency
of 3/2. In the (unique) Nash flow, all traffic goes through the path s, v, w, t . The players’ latency is 2, which gives a PoA of 4/3. (b). In the subnetwork
obtained by removing the edge (v,w), the Nash flow coincides with the optimal flow. Hence the network on the left is paradox-ridden, and the network
on the right is its best subnetwork.
for approximating the equilibrium latency on the best subnetwork is the trivial one, which does not remove any edges and
achieves an approximation ratio of 4/3 for linear latencies and⌊n/2⌋ for general latencies.
Contribution. The motivating question for this work is whether there are some practically interesting settings where a set of
edges, whose removal significantly improves the equilibrium latency, can be computed efficiently. Rather surprisingly, we
answer this question in the affirmative for several interesting cases. To the best of our knowledge, our results are the first
of theoretical nature which indicate that Braess’s paradox can be efficiently detected and eliminated in many interesting
cases. Throughout this paper, wemostly focus on the important case of linear latencies, even though some of our results can
be generalized to other classes of latency functions (e.g. polynomial latencies).
We first consider the problem of recognizing paradox-ridden instances (cf. Section 2.1, ParRid). Even though this problem
is NP-complete for arbitrary linear latencies [33], we show that it becomes polynomially solvable for the important case
[19, Fig. 2] of strictly increasing linear latencies1. Our starting point is the observation that recognizing a paradox-ridden
instance is equivalent to deciding whether the instance admits an optimal flow that is a Nash flow on its subnetwork (cf.
Lemma 1). Then removing all edges not used by the optimal flow yields the best subnetwork with PoA = 1. However, an
instance may admit many different optimal flows. In fact, the NP-hardness proofs in [33] employ networks where almost
all edges have constant latency and they admit exponentially many optimal flows (see also [16, Section 1.6]). On the other
hand, if the optimal flow is unique, we can recognize paradox-ridden instances by computing it and checking whether
it is a Nash flow on its subnetwork. Based on this observation, we present a polynomial-time algorithm that recognizes
paradox-ridden instances with strictly increasing linear latencies (cf. Theorem 1). Furthermore, we reduce the problem of
recognizing a paradox-ridden networkwith (arbitrary) linear latencies to the problemof generating all optimal basic feasible
solutions of a Linear Program that describes the optimal traffic allocations to the edges with constant latency (cf. Lemma 2
and Theorem 2).
But, not all networks are paradox-ridden, in the sense that the best subnetwork wrt common latency induces PoA > 1,
since the selfish flow of it differs from the overall network optimal flow.We tackle such networks by proceeding to themore
general problem of computing the best subnetwork and its equilibrium latency (cf. Section 2.1, BSubEL). For instances with
polynomially many paths, each of polylogarithmic length, and arbitrary linear latencies, we present a subexponential-time
approximation scheme. For any ε > 0, the algorithm computes a subnetwork with an ε-Nash flow in which the players’
latencies are within an additive term of ε/2 from the equilibrium latency on the best subnetwork. The running time is
exponential in poly(logm)/ε2, wherem is the number of edges (cf. Theorem 3). The analysis is based on a novel application
of the Probabilistic Method [1] motivated by Althöfer’s Lemma [2] and its application to the computation of approximate
Nash equilibria for bimatrix games [25,26]. In particular, we apply the Probabilistic Method and show that any flow on any
network admits an ε-approximate ‘‘sparse’’ flow, which assigns traffic to O(logm/ε2) paths (cf. Lemma 3). The proof has to
take advantage of the network structure, since the number of paths may be exponential in m. Hence, our result comprises
a novel (and more efficient) extension of Althöfer’s Lemma to the network setting. In addition, the application to the best
subnetwork approximation deals with a congestion gamewith an infinite number of players, and is fundamentally different
from the application of Althöfer’s Lemma to the approximation of Nash equilibria for bimatrix games. In fact, to the best of
our knowledge, this is the first time that similar techniques are applied in the context of selfish routing.
Moreover, we show that for instances with strictly increasing linear latencies that are not paradox-ridden, there is an
instance-dependent δ > 0, such that the equilibrium latency (on the original network) is within a factor of 4/3 − δ from
the equilibrium latency on the best subnetwork. Since we can efficiently compute the best subnetwork for paradox-ridden
instances, we can use the trivial algorithm for the remaining ones, and approximate the equilibrium latency on the best
subnetwork within a factor strictly smaller than the inapproximability threshold2 of 4/3 (cf. Theorem 4).
1 We note that constant latency edges represent links of practically infinite capacity. Therefore real-world instances are most unlikely to contain a large
number of constant latency edges, if they contain any.
2 The reduction of [33, Theorem 3.3] constructs instances where almost all edges have constant latency 0. Using some very slowly increasing linear
latency (namely, using ℓ(x) = εx, for some very small ε > 0) instead of 0, we can show that even for strictly increasing linear latencies, it is NP-hard to
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Finally, if the instance is paradox-free (no edge deletions can improve PoA) or not paradox-ridden (no edge deletions can
induce PoA = 1) however, it is not possible to turn the optimal flow into a Nash flow by just removing edges. Enforcing
the optimal flow is possible, if in addition to removing edges, the administrator can modify the latency functions of the
remaining ones (cf. Section 2.1, MinLatMod). In the last part of the paper, we present a polynomial-time algorithm for the
problem of minimally modifying the latency functions of the edges used by the optimal flow so that the optimal flow is
enforced as a Nash flow on the subnetwork used by the optimal flow with the modified latencies (cf. Theorem 5).
Other related work3. For the problem of finding the best subnetwork in the atomic model with unsplittable traffic, Azar and
Epstein [3] obtained strong inapproximability results similar to those in [33]. In particular, they proved that for linear and
polynomial latency functions, it is NP-hard to approximate theNash equilibrium total latency on the best subnetworkwithin
any factor smaller than the worst-case PoA for the corresponding class of games.
Interestingly, Braess’s paradox can be dramaticallymore severe inmulti-commodity instances than in single-commodity
ones. More precisely, Lin et al. [23] proved that for single-commodity instances with general latency functions, the removal
of at most k edges cannot improve the equilibrium latency by a factor greater than k + 1. On the other hand, Lin et al.
[24] presented a 2-commodity instance where the removal of a single edge improves the equilibrium latency by a factor
of 2Ω(n). As for the impact of the network topology, Milchtaich [28] proved that Braess’s paradox does not occur in (single-
commodity) series-parallel networks, which is precisely the class of networks that do not contain the network in Fig. 1(a)
as a topological minor.
2. Model, preliminaries, problem definitions, and results
Selfish routing instance. A selfish routing instance is a tuple G = (G(V , E), (ℓe)e∈E, r), where G(V , E) is a directed network
with a source s and a destination t , ℓe : R≥0 → R≥0 is a non-decreasing latency function associated with each edge e, and
r > 0 is the rate of traffic entering the network at s and leaving the network at t . Let n = |V |, let m = |E|, and let P (or
PG, whenever the network G is not clear from the context) denote the (non-empty) set of simple directed s − t paths in G.
We assume that the edge latency functions ℓe(x) are continuous, differentiable, and convex in the interval [0, r]. Wemostly
focus on linear latency functions ℓe(x) = aex + be, with rational coefficients ae, be ≥ 0. Such a linear latency function is
constant if ae = 0.
Subnetworks and subinstances. Given a selfish routing instance G = (G(V , E), (ℓe)e∈E, r), any subgraph H(V , E ′), E ′ ⊆ E,
obtained from G by edge deletions is called a subnetwork of G. H has the same source s and destination t as G, and the edges
of H preserve their latencies in G. Each instanceH = (H(V , E ′), (ℓe)e∈E′ , r), where H(V , E ′) is a subnetwork of G(V , E), is
called a subinstance of G.
Flows. A (G-feasible) flow f is a non-negative vector indexed by P so that

p∈P fp = r . For a flow f , let fe =

p:e∈p fp be
the amount of flow that f routes on e. Two flows f and g are different if there is an edge ewith fe ≠ ge. An edge e is used by
flow f if fe > 0. Given a flow f , the latency of each edge e is ℓe(fe), and the latency of each path p is ℓp(f ) =e∈p ℓe(fe). For
an instance G defined on a network G(V , E) and a flow f , we let Ef = {e ∈ E : fe > 0} be the set of edges used by f , and
Gf (V , Ef ) be the corresponding subnetwork of G. A flow f is acyclic if Gf contains no cycles.
Optimal flow. The total latency of flow f , denoted C(f ), is C(f ) =p∈P fpℓp(f ) =e∈E feℓe(fe). The optimal flow of instance
G, denoted o, minimizes the total latency among all G-feasible flows. We let L∗(G) = C(o)/r be the average latency in the
optimal flow. We note that for every subinstanceH of G, L∗(H) ≥ L∗(G). For an instance G defined on a network G and an
optimal flow o, Go(V , Eo) is the subnetwork of G determined by the edges used by o.
For the latency functions considered in this paper, an optimal flow can be computed efficiently, while for strictly
increasing latencies, the optimal flow is unique (in the sense that all optimal flows route the same amount of traffic on
every edge). The precise statements of these properties, along with other useful properties of optimal flows can be found in
the Appendix.
Nash flow. The traffic is divided among an infinite population of players, each willing to route a negligible amount of traffic
through a minimum latency s − t path. A flow f is a Nash equilibrium flow, or simply a Nash flow, if it routes all traffic
on minimum latency paths. Formally, f is a Nash flow if for every path p with fp > 0, and every path p′, ℓp(f ) ≤ ℓp′(f ).
Therefore, in a Nash flow f , all players incur a common latency L(f ) = minp:fp>0 ℓp(f ) on their paths, and the total latency is
C(f ) = rL(f ). We note that a Nash flow f on a network G(V , E) is a Nash flow on any subnetwork G′(V , E ′) of Gwith Ef ⊆ E ′.
For the latency functions considered in this paper, every instance G admits at least one Nash flow, and the common
players’ latency (and thus the total latency) is the same for all Nash flows (see e.g. Lemma 9 in the Appendix). Hence, for a
fixed instance G, we let L(G) (resp. rL(G)) be the common players’ latency (resp. total latency) for some Nash flow of G. We
refer to L(G) (resp. rL(G)) as the equilibrium latency (resp. equilibrium total latency) ofG. We note that for every subinstance
H ofG, L∗(G) ≤ L(H), and that theremay be subinstancesH with L(H) < L(G) (see Fig. 1). For the class of latency functions
approximate the equilibrium latency on the best subnetwork within a factor considerably smaller than 4/3 for all instances. In this sense, our result is best
possible.
3 We have restricted the discussion of relatedwork to themost relevant results on the detection and elimination of Braess’s paradox. Nevertheless, there
has been a large body ofwork on quantifying andmitigating the consequences of Braess’s paradox on selfish traffic, especially in the areas of Transportation
Science and Computer Networks. The interested reader may e.g. see [33] for an extensive list of references.
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considered in this paper, a Nash flow can be computed in polynomial time, while for strictly increasing latencies, the Nash
flow is unique. The precise statements of these properties, along with other useful properties of Nash flows can be found in
the Appendix.
A characterization of Nash and optimal flows. For any instance G = (G(V , E), (ℓe)e∈E, r) with convex latency functions,
a (G-feasible) flow f is a Nash flow iff for any (G-feasible) flow g ,

e∈E feℓe(fe) ≤

e∈E geℓe(fe) (see e.g. [8, (2.4)]). A
flow o is optimal iff it is a Nash flow for the instance G′ = (G(V , E), (ℓ∗e )e∈E, r), where ℓ∗e (x) = d(xℓe(x))/dx (see e.g.
[34, Corollary 2.7]). Using the previous characterization of Nash flows, we obtain that a (G-feasible) flow o is optimal iff for
any (G-feasible) flow g ,
e∈E
oeℓ∗e (oe) ≤

e∈E
geℓ∗e (oe) (1)
ε-Nash flow. The definition of a Nash flow can be naturally generalized to that of an ‘‘almost Nash’’ flow. Formally, for some
ε > 0, a flow f is an ε-Nash flow if for every path pwith fp > 0, and every path p′, ℓp(f ) ≤ ℓp′(f )+ ε.
Price of Anarchy. The Price of Anarchy (PoA) of a selfish routing instance G, denoted ρ(G), is the ratio of the equilibrium total
latency to the optimal total latency. By the discussion above, ρ(G) = L(G)/L∗(G). For linear latencies, ρ(G) ≤ 4/3 [30],
while for general latencies, ρ(G) ≤⌊n/2⌋ [33].
Other notation and conventions. For any integer k ≥ 1, we let [k] = {1, . . . , k}. For an event E in a sample space, we let
P[E] denote the probability of event E happening. For a random variable X , we let E[X] denote the expectation of X . For
convenience and wlog., we normalize the traffic rate to 1.4 Then L(G) equals both the common players’ latency and the total
latency at equilibrium, and L∗(G) equals both the optimal average latency and the optimal total latency of G. With the traffic
rate normalized to 1, we simply identify a selfish routing instance with the corresponding network. Thus, given an instance
G defined on a network G, we write L(G) (resp. L∗(G)) to denote the equilibrium (resp. optimal) latency of G, and ρ(G) to
denote the PoA of G.
Paradox-free and paradox-ridden instances. An instance G defined on a network G is paradox-free if for every subnetwork H
of G, L(H) ≥ L(G). Paradox-free instances do not suffer from Braess’s paradox and their PoA cannot be improved by edge
removal. If the instance is not paradox-free, edge removal can decrease the equilibrium latency by a factor greater than 1
and at most ρ(G). An instance G is paradox-ridden if there is a subnetwork H of G such that L(H) = L∗(G) = L(G)/ρ(G).
Namely, the PoA of paradox-ridden instances can decrease to 1 by edge removal.
Wehighlight that our definition of paradox-ridden instances ismore general than the definition of [33, pp. 932]. Precisely,
our definition classifies as paradox-ridden any instance where the Price of Anarchy ρ(G) can decrease to 1 by edge removal,
while the definition of [33, pp. 932] classifies as paradox-ridden only instances for which the Price of Anarchy is 4/3 (for
linear latencies) and can decrease to 1 by edge removal. Hence, our definition classifies as paradox-ridden all instances
classified as such by the definition of [33, pp. 932] and some additional instances. Since we present a polynomial-time
algorithm for the recognition of paradox-ridden instances, a more general definition only makes our result stronger.
Best subnetwork. Given instance G, the best subnetwork HB is a subnetwork of G minimizing the equilibrium latency, i.e.
L(HB) ≤ L(H) for any subnetwork H of G.
2.1. Problem definitions and results
We now introduce three basic problems regarding selfish network design:
1. Paradox-Ridden Recognition (ParRid) : Given an instance G, decide if G is paradox-ridden.
2. Best Subnetwork Equilibrium Latency (BSubEL) : Given an instance G defined on a network G, find the best subnetwork HB
of G and its equilibrium latency L(HB).
3.MinimumLatencyModification (MinLatMod) : Given an instanceGdefined on a networkG(V , E)with a polynomial latency
ℓe(x) = di=0 ae,ixi, ae,i ≥ 0, for each e ∈ E, find a set of modified latencies ℓ˜e(x) = di=0 a˜e,ixi, a˜e,i ≥ 0, e ∈ Eo, so that
the Euclidean distance of the vectors (ae,i)e∈Eo,i∈[d] and (a˜e,i)e∈Eo,i∈[d] is minimum, and for the instance G˜o defined on the
network Go(V , Eo)with latencies ℓ˜e(x), o is a Nash flow with common latency L∗(G).
We note that for MinLatMod, the new instance is defined only on the edges used by the optimal flow o. So, the network
designer first removes the edges with no traffic in the optimal flow, and then adjusts the latency functions of the remaining
edges in Go.
Roughgarden [33] proved that ParRid is NP-hard to decide even for instances with latency functions in the class {x, 1, 0},
and BSubEL is NP-hard to approximate within a factor of 4/3 − ε for linear latencies, and within a factor of⌊n/2⌋−ε for
general latencies, for any constant ε > 0. The only known approximation algorithm for BSubEL is the trivial one, which
returns the entire network and achieves an approximation ratio of 4/3 for linear latencies and⌊n/2⌋ for general latencies.
4 Given an instance Gwith traffic rate r > 0, we can modify the (linear or polynomial) latency functions and construct an instance G′ with traffic rate 1
so that (i) a flow is optimal (resp. Nash) for G iff it is optimal (resp. Nash) for G′ , (ii) ρ(G) = ρ(G′), and (iii) a best subnetwork of G is a best subnetwork of
G′ and vice versa.
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Results. We obtain the first polynomial-time algorithms for ParRid, in the case of strictly increasing linear latencies, and
for MinLatMod, and polynomial-time approximation algorithms for BSubEL that improve on the trivial algorithm for two
interesting settings.
For ParRid, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm that decides it on instances with strictly linear increasing latencies
(cf. Theorem 1). We extend our method to instances with linear latencies where constant latencies are allowed, under a
general condition that restricts the number of different optimal flows (cf. Theorem 2). In particular, we show that ParRid
reduces to generating all optimal basic feasible solutions of a Linear Program (LP) that describes the optimal traffic allocations
to the constant latency edges (cf. Lemma 2). This task can be efficiently performed if the number of constant latency edges
is small, which is usually the case in real-world networks.
For BSubEL, we first consider networks with polynomially many paths, each of polylogarithmic length, and linear
latencies. For such input networks the link-route incidence matrix [19, Sec. 2] can be efficiently constructed, since it has
polynomially many columns (paths or routes), with poly(log n) positive entries in each column. We note that we do not
need to know the paths in advance. A depth-first-search algorithm can find them in polynomial time, since each path has a
polylogarithmic path length and the total number of paths is a polynomial. In this setting, we provide a subexponential-time
approximation scheme, which for any ε > 0, computes a subnetwork with an ε-Nash flow in which the players’ latencies
are at most L(HB)+ ε/2. The algorithm’s running time is exponential in poly(logm)/ε2 (cf. Lemma 3 and Theorem 3).
Moreover, we show that for networks G that are not paradox-ridden and have strictly increasing linear latencies, there is
an instance-dependent δ > 0, such that L(G) ≤ (4/3− δ)L(HB). Using the algorithm for ParRid to recognize paradox-ridden
instances and the trivial algorithm for the remaining ones, we obtain a polynomial-time algorithm for BSubEL that achieves
an approximation ratio smaller than 4/3 for instances with strictly increasing linear latencies (cf. Theorem 4).
For MinLatMod, we show how to reduce it to the solution of a convex quadratic separable minimization problem,
thus obtaining a polynomial-time algorithm (cf. Theorem 5). This approach is quite useful when either finding the best
subnetwork is hard, or the equilibrium latency on the best subnetwork is not close to the optimal average latency. In such
cases, the algorithm for MinLatMod can enforce the optimal flow by keeping the network modifications (and the cost for
implementing them) at a minimal level, while not increasing the players’ disutility, as refundable tolls do.
3. Recognizing paradox-ridden instances
In this section, we present a polynomial-time algorithm for ParRid on instances with strictly increasing linear latencies.
We start with the following lemma that reduces ParRid to the problem of checking whether there is some optimal flow o
that is a Nash flow on Go.
Lemma 1. Let G be an instance defined on a network G(V , E). Then G is paradox-ridden iff there is an optimal flow o that is a
Nash flow on the subnetwork Go(V , Eo).
Proof. If there is an optimal flow o that is a Nash flow on Go, then Go is a subnetwork of G with L(Go) = L∗(G), and G is
paradox-ridden. If G is paradox-ridden, let H be a subnetwork of G with L(H) = L∗(G), and let f be a Nash flow on H . The
flow f is a Nash flow on Gf (V , Ef ) as well. Moreover, since L(f ) = L∗(G), f is an optimal flow of G. Hence, there is an optimal
flow that is a Nash flow on the subnetwork determined by its used edges. 
For instances with strictly increasing linear latencies, the optimal flow is unique (see Remark 1 in the Appendix) and can
be efficiently computed. Then, checking whether the optimal flow o is a Nash flow on Go can be performed by a shortest
path computation. Hence we obtain the following.
Theorem 1. ParRid can be decided in polynomial time for instances with strictly increasing linear latency functions.
Proof. Computing the (unique) optimal flow o for an instance G with strictly increasing linear latencies reduces to solving
a convex quadratic separable min-cost flow problem, which can be performed in polynomial time (see Lemma 7 in the
Appendix). To check whether o is a Nash flow on the subnetwork Go(V , Eo), we compute the length d(v) of the shortest
s − v path wrt the edge lengths {ℓe(oe)}e∈Eo for all vertices v ∈ V . Then o is a Nash flow if for every edge (u, v) ∈ Eo,
d(v) = d(u) + ℓ(u,v)(o(u,v)) (see [33, Proposition 2.10]). Since the optimal flow o is unique, we use Lemma 1 and decide
whether G is paradox-ridden in polynomial-time. 
Dealing with constant latencies. Next we formulate a general sufficient condition, under which ParRid can be decided in
polynomial time for instances with (not necessarily increasing) linear latencies. Let G be an instance defined on a network
G(V , E) with linear latencies ℓe(x) = aex + be, let Ec = {e ∈ E : ae = 0} be the set of edges with constant latencies,
let E i = E \ Ec be the set of edges with strictly increasing latencies, and let O be the set of different optimal flows of G.
If |Ec | > 1, it may be that |O| > 1, in which case Lemma 1 reduces ParRid to examining if some optimal flow o ∈ O is
a Nash flow on Go. This can be performed efficiently, if there is a procedure that generates all optimal flows in polynomial
time.
By Lemmas 9 and 10 in the Appendix, all optimal flows assign the same traffic to the edges with strictly increasing
latencies, and can differ only on edges with constant latencies. Assuming a fixed optimal flow o, we formulate a Linear
D. Fotakis et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 448 (2012) 9–20 15
Program whose feasible solutions correspond to all (G-feasible) flows that agree with the optimal flows on the edges with
strictly increasing latencies.
min

e∈Ec
febe
s.t.

u:(v,u)∈Ei
o(v,u) +

u:(v,u)∈Ec
f(v,u) =

u:(u,v)∈Ei
o(u,v) +

u:(u,v)∈Ec
f(u,v) ∀v ∈ V \ {s, t}
u:(s,u)∈Ei
o(s,u) +

u:(s,u)∈Ec
f(s,u) = 1 (LP)
u:(u,t)∈Ei
o(u,t) +

u:(u,t)∈Ec
f(u,t) = 1
fe ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ Ec
(LP) has a variable fe for each edge e ∈ Ec , while all o-related terms are fixed and determined by o. A feasible solution to
(LP) corresponds to a G-feasible flow that agrees with o (and any other optimal flow) on all edges in E i. An optimal solution
to (LP) corresponds to a flow that agrees with o on all edges in E i and allocates traffic to the edges in Ec so that the total
latency is minimized (note that the total latency on the edges in E i, namely the term

e∈Ei(aeo2e + beoe), is fixed for all
feasible solutions). Hence, every optimal solution to (LP) corresponds to an optimal flow. On the other hand, every optimal
flow o′ has oe = o′e for all e ∈ E i, and is translated into an optimal solution to (LP) by setting fe = o′e for all e ∈ Ec . Therefore,
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the optimal solutions to (LP) and the optimal flows in O. Hence, we obtain
the following.
Lemma 2. The number of optimal flows of a selfish routing instance G with linear latencies is equal to the number of optimal
solutions to (LP). Moreover, each optimal solution to (LP) can be translated into an optimal flow of G, and vice versa.
Given an optimal flow o, Lemma 2 reduces the problem of checking if there is a o′ ∈ O that is a Nash flow on Go′ to the
problem of generating all optimal solutions of (LP) and checking whether some of them can be translated into a Nash flow
on the corresponding subnetwork. This can be performed in polynomial time if (LP)’s optimal solution is unique (see e.g.
[27, Theorem 2] on how to decide the uniqueness of the optimal solution of a Linear Program). Thus,
Theorem 2. ParRid can be decided in polynomial time for instances with linear latency functions where (LP) has a unique optimal
solution.
Since (LP) allocates traffic to constant latency edges only, the latency on any s− t path is the same for all traffic patterns.
Hence, if a feasible solution f can be translated into a Nash flow on its subnetwork Gf , the same holds for any other feasible
solution f ′ with {e : f ′e > 0} ⊆ {e : fe > 0}. This holds because f and f ′ have the same latency on all s − t paths used by
them, and the subnetwork of f ′ consists of a subset of the edges in the subnetwork of f . Thus, if f is a Nash flow on Gf , f ′ is a
Nash flow on Gf ′ . Thus, in case that (LP) does not have a unique solution, we can restrict our attention to optimal solutions
with a minimal number of used edges, which correspond to the basic feasible solutions of (LP). Therefore, the approach of
Theorem 2 can be extended to instances where (LP) has a small number of basic feasible solutions (i.e. polynomial many in
m). For example, this class includes the important case of instances with a constant number of constant latency edges.
Remark. In the network employed in the NP-hardness proof of [33], almost all edges have constant latency (see also
[16, Section 1.6]). Thus, this network admits exponentially many optimal flows, and cannot be efficiently recognized with
the approach of this section.
4. Approximating the best subnetwork
We give two types of approximation for the best subnetwork and its equilibrium latency on instances with linear
latencies. We first consider networks with polynomially many paths, each of polylogarithmic length, and present a
subexponential-time approximation scheme for BSubEL.
Networks with polynomially many short paths. We first show that any flow can be approximated by a ‘‘sparse’’ flow that
assigns traffic to at most a logarithmic (in the m edges of E) number of paths. The proof is along the lines of the proof of
Althöfer’s ‘‘Sparsification’’ Lemma [2].
Lemma 3. Let G be an instance defined on a network G(V , E), and let f be any G-feasible flow. For any ε > 0, there exists a
G-feasible flow f˜ that assigns positive traffic to at most

log(2m)/(2ε2)
+1 paths, such that |f˜e − fe| ≤ ε, for all edges e.
Proof. For convenience, we let µ = |P | denote the number of paths in G, and index the s − t paths in G by integers in
[µ]. We recall that the traffic rate is normalized to 1. Then, we can interpret the flow f as a probability distribution on
the set of paths P , where fj is the probability that path j is selected. We prove that if we select k > log(2m)/(2ε2) paths
uniformly at random with replacement according to (the probability distribution) f , and assign to each path j a flow equal
to the number of times j is selected divided by k, we obtain a flow that is an ε-approximation to f with positive probability.
By the Probabilistic Method (see e.g. [1]), such a flow exists.
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Let ε be any fixed positive number, and let k = log(2m)/(2ε2)+1. We define k independent identically distributed
random variables P1, . . . , Pk, each taking an integer value in [µ] according to distribution f . Namely, for all i ∈ [k] and
j ∈ [µ], P[Pi = j] = fj.
For each path j ∈ [µ], let Fj be a random variable defined as Fj = |{i ∈ [k] : Pi = j}|/k. By linearity of expectation,
E[Fj] = fj. For each edge e ∈ E and each random variable Pi, i ∈ [k], we define an indicator variable Fe,i that is 1 if e is
included in the path indicated by Pi, and 0 otherwise. Since the random variables {Pi}i∈[k] are independent, for every fixed
edge e, the variables {Fe,i}i∈[k] are independent as well. In addition, for every edge e, let Fe be a random variable defined as
the average of the indicator variables Fe,i, i.e. Fe = 1k
k
i=1 Fe,i. By the definition of the random variables {Fj}j∈[µ], Fe is equal
to the sum of Fj’s over all paths j that include e. Formally, Fe =j:e∈j Fj = 1k ki=1 Fe,i. By linearity of expectation, E[Fe] = fe
for all edges e.
Since
µ
j=1 Fj = 1, we can interpret the value of each Fj as an amount of flow assigned to path j, and the value of each Fe
as an amount of flow assigned to edge e. Then the random variables F1, . . . , Fµ define a (G-feasible) flow on G that assigns
positive traffic to at most k paths and agrees with f in expectation. It suffices to show that the probability that there is an
edge ewith |Fe − fe| > ε is less than 1. By applying the Chernoff–Hoeffding bound5, we obtain that for each fixed edge e,
P[|Fe − fe| > ε] ≤ 2e−2ε2k < 1/m.
The first inequality holds because E[Fe] = fe, and Fe is the average of k independent 0/1 random variables. For the second
inequality, we use that k > log(2m)/(2ε2).
By applying the union bound, we obtain that P[∃e : |Fe − fe| > ε] < m(1/m) = 1. Therefore, for any integer
k > log(2m)/(2ε2), there is positive probability that the (G-feasible) flow (F1, . . . , Fµ), which assigns positive flow to at
most k paths, satisfies |Fe − fe| ≤ ε for all e ∈ E. By the Probabilistic Method, there exists a flow f˜ with the properties of
(F1, . . . , Fµ). 
For any ε > 0, let ϵ1 > 0 depend on ε and on some parameters of the instance G. Lemma 3 guarantees the existence of an
ϵ1-approximation f˜ to a Nash flow f on the best subnetwork L(HB) that assigns positive traffic to atmost

log(2m)/(2ϵ21)
+1
paths. If the network G has polynomially many paths, such an f˜ can be found in subexponential time by exhaustive search.
In the following, we show that if all paths in G are relatively short, f˜ is an ε-Nash flow on Gf˜ , and all players’ latencies in f˜
are at most L(HB)+ ε/2. Thus we obtain a subexponential approximation scheme for the BSubEL.
Theorem 3. Let G = (G(V , E), (aex+ be)e∈E, 1) be an instance with linear latency functions, let α = maxe∈E{ae}, and let HB be
the best subnetwork of G. For some constants d1, d2, let |P | ≤ md1 and |p| ≤ logd2 m, for all p ∈ P . Then, for any ε > 0, we can
compute in time
mO(d1α
2 log2d2+1(2m)/ε2)
a flow f˜ that is an ε-Nash flow on Gf˜ and satisfies ℓp(f˜ ) ≤ L(HB)+ ε/2, for all paths p in Gf˜ .
Proof. Let ε > 0 be any fixed constant, let ϵ1 = ε/(2α logd2(2m)), and let f be a Nash flow on the best subnetworkHB. Then,
L(f ) = L(HB). In the following, we assume wlog that f is acyclic, and that HB is precisely Gf (V , Ef ). By applying Lemma 3 to
HB and f with approximation parameter ϵ1, we obtain that there exists a G-feasible flow f˜ on HB that assigns positive flow
to at most
k =

log(2m)
2ϵ21

+1 =

2α2 log2d2+1(2m)
ε2

+1
paths, and satisfies |fe − f˜e| ≤ ϵ1 for all edges e in HB, and f˜e = 0 for all edges e outside HB. Since f is acyclic, f˜ is acyclic too.
Next we show that f˜ is an ε-Nash flow on the subnetwork Gf˜ (V , Ef˜ ) determined by the edges used by f˜ . For every
p ∈ PGf˜ ⊆ PHB , ℓp(f ) =

e∈p(aefe + be) = L(HB), since f is a Nash flow on HB. In addition, since f˜e ≤ fe + ϵ1 for all
edges e in HB, and thus for all edges in Gf˜ ,
ℓp(f˜ ) ≤ e∈p(ae(fe + ϵ1)+ be)
≤ L(HB)+ |p|α ϵ1
≤ L(HB)+ ε/2,
where the last inequality follows from the choice of ϵ1 and the polylogarithmic upper bound on the length of the paths in G.
Similarly, using that f˜e ≥ fe − ϵ1 for all edges e in HB, we show that for every path p ∈ PGf˜ , ℓp(f˜ ) ≥ L(HB)− ε/2. Therefore,
5 We use the following form of the Chernoff–Hoeffding bound (see [14]): let X1, . . . , Xk be random variables independently distributed in [0, 1], and let
X = 1k
k
i=1 Xi . Then, for all ε > 0, P[|X − E[X]| > ε] ≤ 2e−2ε2k , where e = 2.71 . . . is the basis of natural logarithms.
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there exists a G-feasible acyclic flow f˜ that assigns positive flow to at most k paths, is an ε-Nash flow on Gf˜ , and satisfies
|ℓp(f˜ )− L(HB)| ≤ ε/2 for all paths p in Gf˜ .
A flowwith the properties of f˜ can be computed in timemO(d1k) by exhaustive search. In particular, for eachmultiset with
k paths from P , we generate the corresponding flow g in the same way that in the proof of Lemma 3, the flow (F1, . . . , Fµ)
is constructed from (the actual values of) P1, . . . , Pk. If the subnetwork Gg is acyclic, we check whether g is an ε-Nash flow
on Gg . This can be performed by computing the minimum and the maximum latency paths in Gg , and checking whether
their latencies differ by at most ε. Since Gg is a directed acyclic network, the minimum and the maximum latency paths
can be computed in polynomial time. Among all acyclic flows that are ε-Nash flows on the corresponding subnetworks, we
return the one that minimizes the latency on the maximum latency path. Since exhaustive search encounters f˜ , this latency
cannot exceed L(HB)+ ε/2. Hence we return a flow that is an ε-Nash flow on the corresponding subnetwork, and has all its
path latencies bounded from above by L(HB)+ ε/2. Since G has at mostmd1 different paths, there are at mostmd1k different
multisets with k paths from P , and the exhaustive search takes at mostmO(d1k) time. 
Instances with strictly increasing latencies.Next we focus on instances with strictly increasing linear latencies, and show how
to approximate the equilibrium latency on the best subnetwork within a factor less than the inapproximability threshold of
4/3.
Theorem 4. For instances with strictly increasing linear latencies, BSubEL can be approximated in polynomial time within a
factor of 4/3− δ, where δ > 0 depends on the instance.
Proof. Let G be an instance with strictly increasing linear latencies defined on a network G(V , E), and let HB be the best
subnetwork of G. If G is paradox-ridden, by Theorem 1, we can recognize it and compute the best subnetwork HB and its
equilibrium latency L(HB) in polynomial time. Hence for paradox-ridden instances, we have an approximation ratio of 1.
If G is not paradox-ridden, we use the trivial algorithm that returns the entire network G. Next we prove that there is an
instance-dependent δ > 0, such that L(G)/L(HB) ≤ ρ(G) − δ. Since G has linear latencies, ρ(G) ≤ 4/3, and the theorem
follows.
Let f be the Nash flow on the best subnetwork HB, and let o be the optimal flow of G. Since G is not paradox-ridden, the
flows f and o are different. By Taylor’s expansion for quadratic functions,
e∈E
(aef 2e + befe) =

e∈E
(aeo2e + beoe)+

e∈E
(2aeoe + be)(fe − oe)+

e∈E
ae(fe − oe)2 ⇔
C(f ) = C(o)+

e∈E
(2aeoe + be)(fe − oe)+

e∈E
ae(fe − oe)2  
= σ
. (2)
We note that σ > 0 because

e∈E ae(fe − oe)2 > 0, since ae > 0 for all e ∈ E and f and o are different, and
e∈E(2aeoe + be)(fe − oe) ≥ 0, by the characterization of optimal flows by (1).
Using that the traffic rate is 1, we obtain that C(f ) = L(f ) = L(HB), and C(o) = L∗(G). Moreover, by the definition of the
PoA, L∗(G) = L(G)/ρ(G). Therefore, (2) implies that
L(HB) = L(G)/ρ(G)+ σ ⇒ L(G)/L(HB) = ρ(G)− ρ(G)σ/L(HB).
Setting δ = ρ(G)σ/L(HB) > 0 concludes the proof of the theorem. 
5. Enforcing the optimal flow by latency modifications
Despite our positive results, there are instances where either finding the best subnetwork is hard, or the equilibrium
latency on the best subnetwork is not close to the optimal average latency. For such instances, we present a polynomial-
time algorithm that enforces the optimal flow by performing a minimal amount of latency modifications on the edges used
by the optimal flow.
Theorem 5. MinLatMod can be solved in polynomial time for instances with polynomial latency functions.
Proof. Let G be an instance defined on a network G(V , E) with a polynomial latency function ℓe(x) = di=0 ae,ixi, ae,i ≥ 0,
for each e ∈ E. We can efficiently compute an optimal flow owithin any specified accuracy (see Lemma 8 in the Appendix)
and the corresponding subnetwork Go(V , Eo).
Let α = (ae,i)e∈Eo,i∈[d] be the coefficient vector of the latency functions for the edges used by the optimal flow o. We seek,
due to monetary reasons, to turn the optimal flow o into a Nash flow of average latency L∗(G) on Go(V , Eo) by modifying α
as little as possible. So, we first remove from the network any edges not used by the optimal flow o, and obtain Go. Then,
we seek a minimummodification of the latency functions of the remaining edges so that the optimal flow o routes all traffic
onminimum latency paths in the modified instance. More formally, we seek a modified coefficient vector α˜ = (a˜e,i)e∈Eo,i∈[d]
so that the Euclidean distance of α and α˜ is minimized, and for the instance G˜o defined on Go with latency functions
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ℓ˜e(x) = di=0 a˜e,ixi, a˜e,i ≥ 0, e ∈ Eo, the flow o is a Nash flow with common latency L∗(G). The best coefficient vector
α˜ is given by the optimal solution to the following Quadratic Program:
min

e∈Eo
d
i=1
(ae,i − a˜e,i)2
s.t.

e∈p
d
i=0
a˜e,i oie = L∗(G) ∀p ∈ PGo (QP)
a˜e,i ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ Eo, ∀i ∈ [d].
The equality constraints of (QP) ensure that all paths in Go have a common latency L∗(G) in o wrt the modified latency
functions ℓ˜. Since Go only consists of the edges used by o, this implies that o is a Nash flow with common latency L∗(G) for
the modified instance G˜o (QP) is a convex separable Quadratic Program, and can be solved in polynomial time within any
specified accuracy (see e.g. [22]). Moreover, (QP) always admits a feasible solution since the optimal flow o is a Nash flow
on Go with latency functions ℓ∗e (x) = d(xℓe(x))/dx =
d
i=0(i+ 1)ae,ixi. Therefore, there is aΛ > 0, such that all paths in Go
have a common latencyΛwrt to the latency functions ℓ∗. Scaling the coefficients {(i+1)ae,i}e∈Eo,i∈[d] uniformly by L∗(G)/Λ
gives a feasible solution to (QP). 
Remark. We can use the same approach to compute a modified coefficient vector that turns the optimal flow o into a Nash
flow on Go wrt to themodified latencies with any prescribed common latencyΛ. In particular, the proof of Theorem 5 implies
that by changing the rhs of the equality constraints in (QP) toΛ (instead of L∗(G)), we can efficiently compute a coefficient
vector α˜ so that the Euclidean distance of α and α˜ is minimized, and the optimal flow o is a Nash flowwith common latency
Λ for the corresponding instance G˜o.
Appendix. Basic properties of Nash and optimal flows
Objective and feasible set. Nash flows and optimal flows are closely related, as it is suggested by the objective function for
computing them via the following Non-Linear Program :
(NLP) min
f

e∈E
ηe(fe), where ηe(fe) =

ℓe(fe)fe for an optimal flow fe
0
ℓe(t)dt for a Nash flow.
For an instanceG = (G(V , E), (ℓe)e∈E, r), the feasible set of (NLP) consists of allG-feasible flows. For the instances considered
in this paper, where the latency functions ℓe(x) are non-negative, non-decreasing, continuous, continuously differentiable,
and convex, and there always exist an acyclic optimal flow and an acyclic Nash flow, there is no essential difference between
letting the feasible set of (NLP) consist of all G-feasible edge flows (fe)e∈E , and letting the feasible set of (NLP) consist of all
G-feasible path flows (fp)p∈P . In the following, we call a latency function standard if it is non-negative, non-decreasing,
continuous, continuously differentiable, and convex.
We observe that (NLP) is a separable program, i.e. each non-linear term is a function of a single variable. Furthermore, for
standard latency functions, (NLP) is a convex program.
Interplay of Nash and optimal flows. An important consequence of the convexity of NLP is the following characterizations of
optimal and Nash flows (see e.g. [32]):
Lemma 4. Let G = (G(V , E), (ℓe)e∈E, r) be an instance with standard latency functions. A G-feasible flow o is optimal for G iff it
is a Nash flow for the instance G′ = (G(V , E), (ℓ∗e )e∈E, r), where ℓ∗e (x) = d(xℓe(x))/dx.
Lemma 5. Let G = (G(V , E), (ℓe)e∈E, r) be an instance with standard latency functions. A G-feasible flow f is a Nash flow iff for
any G-feasible flow g,
e∈E
feℓe(fe) ≤

e∈E
geℓe(fe).
Lemma 6. Let G = (G(V , E), (ℓe)e∈E, r) be an instance with standard latency functions, and let ℓ∗e (x) = d(xℓe(x))/dx. A G-
feasible flow o is optimal iff for any G-feasible flow g,
e∈E
oeℓ∗e (oe) ≤

e∈E
geℓ∗e (oe).
Time complexity of (NLP).Minoux [29] proved that the scaling technique of Edmonds and Karp [9], which for linear costs gives
a polynomial running time for the out-of-kilter method, can be applied to separable quadratic min-cost flow problems. Thus
Minoux presented a polynomial-time algorithm for the quadratic min-cost flow problem.
Lemma 7. (NLP) can be solved in polynomial time for instances with linear latency functions ℓe(x) = aex+be with non-negative
rational coefficients ae, be.
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Subsequently, Hochbaum and George Shanthikumar [13] proved that solving convex separable min-cost flow problems
is notmuch harder than linear optimization.More precisely, they presented an algorithm that finds a feasible solutionwhose
components arewithin an additive term of ε from the optimal solution (this is called an ε-accurate solution). The algorithm’s
running time is polynomial in log(1/ε) and the input size. In simple words, the algorithm of Hochbaum and Shanthikumar
computes the optimal solution to any specified accuracy in polynomial time.
Lemma 8. For instances with standard latency functions, an ε-accurate solution to (NLP) can be computed in time polynomial in
log(1/ε) and the input size.
Existence and uniqueness of Nash and optimal flows. The following lemma establishes that for instances with standard latency
functions, a Nash flow exists and all Nash flows have the same common players’ latency and total latency (see e.g. [32]).
Lemma 9. Let G = (G(V , E), (ℓe)e∈E, r) be an instance with standard latency functions. Then, G admits a Nash flow f .
Furthermore, if f , f ′ are Nash flows, then ℓe(fe) = ℓe(f ′e ) for all e ∈ E, ℓp(f ) = ℓp(f ′) for all p ∈ P , L(f ) = L(f ′), and
C(f ) = C(f ′).
Moreover, if the latency functions ℓe are strictly increasing, then the Nash flow is unique (see e.g. [32, Corollary 2.6.4]).
We note that Lemma 10 does not rule out the possibility that some instances with constant latency functions also admit a
unique Nash flow (see e.g. the instance in Fig. 1).
Lemma 10. Let G = (G(V , E), (ℓe)e∈E, r) be an instance with standard strictly increasing latency functions. If f , f ′ are Nash
flows, then fe = f ′e for all e ∈ E.
Remark 1. Lemmas 9 and 10 essentially follow from the convexity of (NLP). By similar arguments, one can prove that for
an instance G = (G(V , E), (ℓe)e∈E, r)with standard latency functions, if o, o′ are optimal flows, then ℓe(oe) = ℓe(o′e), for all
e ∈ E. In addition, if the latency functions are strictly increasing, then oe = o′e for all e ∈ E.
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